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The New Anti-Dumping Procedures of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Does It
Create a New Non-Tariff Trade
Barrier?
The Trade Agreements Acts of 19791 contains what is likely to be
the most extensive modification of U.S. anti-dumping law since the
passage of the original Antidumping Act of 1921.2 The new law makes
five significant changes in anti-dumping investigation procedures
which are intended to streamline investigations, to provide prompter
and more effective relief for domestic industries threatened by unfair
foreign competition, and to provide the agencies with a clearer defini-
tion of their responsibilities.3
These worthy intentions, however, have produced a system that is
unfairly burdensome to foreign manufacturers and domestic import-
ers:4 the shortened time limits may result in inaccurate and prejudicial
1 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified in scattered sections of 13, 19, 26, 28
U.S.C.). The Act became effective on January 1, 1980. Before it could become effective, the
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the GATT had to become effective. Id at § 107. This was done when President Carter signed the
Memorandum of December 15, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 74, 781 (1979).
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was designed to implement the liberalized multilateral
measures negotiated by the participants in the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1478 (President Carter's message
upon submission of the Trade Agreements Act to Congress for passage); DEP'T STAT BULL., Aug.
1979, at 43.
2 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976)). Most of the important
procedural amendments to the Antidumping Act of 1921 were made by the Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5-8, 15, 19, 21-22, 26, 42,
45 U.S.C.).
For ease of drafting, the new law completely revokes all prior legislation and then reenacts
some provisions in essentially the same form. Pub. L. No. 96-39, supra note 1, at § 106.
3 See Implementation of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the SubcomL
on International Trade of the Senate Finance Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Senate MTN Hearings]; Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as House
MTN Hearings]; The Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Hearings Before the Subcomna on Interna-
tional Trade of the Senate Comm. on S. 1376, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Trade Act Hearings]; Administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Administration Hearings].
4 Some witnesses at the subcommittee hearings on the new Act suggested that in the midst of
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findings;5 the new price assurance provisions are unnecessarily harsh
and limit the opportunities for a quick termination of an anti-dumping
investigation;6 the new disclosure rules threaten the competitive secrets
of foreign producers;7 the cash deposit of estimated dumping duties
punishes dumpers unnecessarily;8 and the new procedure for retroac-
tive duty assessment unjustifiably imposes greater risks upon the
dumping defendant.9 By unfairly burdening foreign manufacturers
and domestic importers, the new law creates a barrier to foreign trade
and thus harms both the United States and its trading partners. 10
Because these new procedures are the result of a basic misconcep-
tion of the purposes of anti-dumping law, this comment first will briefly
examine the effects of dumping and anti-dumping legislation in light of
a free trade policy. Second, it will outline the procedures utilized prior
to the 1979 Act to establish the sequence of an anti-dumping investiga-
tion. Next, in order to clearly indicate how the old law has been
changed, the five new procedures adopted by the new Act will be de-
scribed. Finally, this comment will scrutinize these changes in order to
demonstrate how they discourage imports and thus erect a barrier to
trade.
A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE POLICY UNDERLYING
ANTI-DUMPING LAW
The benefits of a free trade policy are theoretically based on what
economists refer to as comparative advantage. The principle of com-
parative advantage states that because of natural advantages, such as
low labor costs, abundant raw materials, or technical expertise, each
country will be better off if it specializes in producing those goods it can
make, relatively, the most cheaply, and then trades for the other goods
it requires." When there are barriers to trade, a country must divert
the debate on the new procedures, some domestic groups took advantage of congressional confu-
sion over the purposes of anti-dumping law to introduce a number of protectionist measures. See
House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 745 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
5 See notes 111-137 and accompanying text infra.
6 See notes 138-157 and accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 158-168 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 169-189 and accompanying text infra.
9 See notes 190-198 and accompanying text infra.
10 For a general discussion of past use of antidumping law as a barrier to trade, see Barcelo,
4ntidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1972); Schwartz, The 4dminis-
tration by the Department of Treasury of the Laws Authorizing the Imposition of Antidumping Du-
ties, 14 VA. J. IT'L L. 463 (1974); Weeks, Introduction to the Antidumping Law: A Form of
Protectionfor theAmerican Manufacturer, 35 ALB. L. REV. 182 (1971); Note, U.S. Protectionism in
International Trade, 61 Ky. L.J. 935 (1972).
11 For a more detailed discussion of comparative advantage theory and its benefits, see G.
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resources to the production of necessary goods that other countries
could have produced more cheaply, thereby diminishing the wealth of
that country.I2 A barrier to trade consists of any practice that prohibits
trade, such as an embargo, or that merely discourages trade, such as
tariffs, quality requirements, or more pertinently, legal procedures that
impose undue costs and uncertainties upon foreign producers.'
3
Broadly defined, dumping occurs when a foreign manufacturer ex-
ports goods to be sold in the United States at a lower price than that to
be charged in his own domestic market. 4 The 1979 Act defines dump-
ing as sales of foreign goods at less than their fair value.' 5
Because markets consist of many sales at many different prices, the
new Act employs a number of theoretical aggregates-United States
price, foreign market value, constructed value, and third country
price-to determine when sales at less than fair value (LTFV) are being
made. 16
Hypothetically, a foreign producer may decide to dump when he
sells in two or more markets, and faces a different elasticity of demand
in each market.' 7 Empirically, although there are a variety of reasons,
HABERLER, A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY (1961); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
668-691 (9th ed. 1973); W. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL
POLICY, 65-73 (1977); Barcelo, supra note 10, at 498.
12 See, e.g., Smith, Restraints on Foreign Imports, in READINGS IN ECONOMICS 335 (P. Samu-
elson, R. Bishop & J. Coleman eds. 1952).
13 Besides tariffs, barriers to trade "include such traditional obstacles as import quotas and
unduly complicated customs procedures which tend to hinder international mobility ofmerchandise.
They also include export subsidies, government procurement policies, and standards set for con-
sumer or user protection." Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating NontarigDistortions to Trade, 7 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 328 (1975) (emphasis added).
14 Technically, dumping occurs whenever a manufacturer sells at a different price in a foreign
market than in his own, ie., a manufacturer may "dump" in his own country. W. WARES, supra
note 11, at 3-7.
15 Pub. L. No. 96-39, supra note 1, at § 731(1).
16 "United States price" is either the price at which the merchandise is agreed to be sold or the
actual sale price in the U.S., each with the appropriate adjustments. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
144, § 772(a) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a). "Foreign market value" is the ordinary
wholesale price of the goods in the producer country. Id at § 733 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673(b). "Constructed value" is used in place of foreign market value under certain circum-
stances, and based on cost of production and normal profit rates in the producer country. Id at
§ 733(e). "Third market value" is also used at times in place of foreign market value and is based
on sales in countries other than the United States or the producer country. Id at § 733(a)(I)(B).
See generally Note, Treasury Runs the Maze: Less Than Fair Value Determinations under the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921, 8 GA. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 919 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GA. Note].
17 See W. WARES, supra note 11, at 10, 31. Elasticity of demand refers to the slope of the
demand curve. An elastic demand means that as the price of a good changes, the number of
consumers willing to purchase that good changes greatly; an inelastic demand means that as the
price of a good changes, the number of consuimers willing to buy that good changes relatively
little. Id
New U.S. Anti-Dumping Procedures
2:200(1980)
dumping often arises when the foreign manufacturer seeks to maintain
full production, either because of economies of scale or strong domestic
competition, but produces more than his limited, perhaps relatively
poorer domestic market can absorb.' 8
Dumping can have both beneficial and harmful effects. The for-
eign manufacturer benefits from increased sales, greater market domi-
nance, and higher profits. 19 Dumping also benefits the American
consumer who buys the cheaper, dumped goods,20 although the foreign
consumer may be harmed, because he faces a higher price than he
would otherwise.21 American producers may be harmed by the in-
creased competition from the lower-priced imports. It is this sort of
harm to American producers that anti-dumping law seeks to prevent. 2
Three types of dumping may be distinguished-price discrimina-
tion per se, injurious dumping, and predatory dumping-and each type
is not equally objectionable.2 3 Price discrimination24 per se is not ille-
gal under U.S. anti-dumping law; dumping that does not injure domes-
tic industry actually may have beneficial effects: "improved efficiency
in the allocation of productive resources through time, innovative vigor
in the production process, and distribution of products to the consumer
at lowest possible prices."' 25 Even injurious dumping is justifiable if it
arises from comparative advantage, and harms only inefficient or non-
competitive domestic producers whose resources could better be used
elsewhere.26 Injurious dumping, however, has long been the overriding
concern of domestic unions, manufacturers, and suppliers,27 and, as did
the prior law, the 1979 Act prohibits any dumping that causes injury to
a domestic industry, regardless of the industry's efficiency or ability to
18 Id. at 7-12. See also J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 23
(1923).
19 W. WARES, rupra note 11, at 7-12.
20 Id at 59-88.
21 Id at 27-54.
22 Id
23 Price discrimination per se "causes only minimal business injury to domestic competitors."
Barcelo, supra note 10, at 499. Injurious dumping "causes recognizable and perhaps significant
business injury in the form of lost sales and lower profits, but of a type normally associated with
ordinary price competition.... ." Id Predatory dumping "includes dumping practices which by
design or in effect cause such pervasive injury to domestic competition as to threaten monopoliza-
tion." Id
24 Price discrimination is merely the charging of different prices in different markets. W.
WARES, supra note 11, at 88-9.
25 Barcelo, supra note 10, at 500.
26 Id
27 See, eg., Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 114-15 (statement of Robert Cornog,
Chairman, Comm. of Domestic Steel Wire Rope and Specialty Cable Mfrs.).
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compete with foreign producers.28 Predatory dumping, as an extreme
form of injurious dumping, is also prohibited.29
The remedies for injurious and predatory dumping are "remedial"
in nature, that is, essentially prophylactic and not punitive.30 The law
is designed merely to force cessation of dumping so that domestic and
foreign producers may compete on a fair and equitable basis.31 There-
fore, any aspect of the law which extends further and prevents non-
injurious dumping or punishes the foreign manufacturer for injurious
dumping will exceed the intent of anti-dumping law and will unneces-
sarily discourage imports.
PAST PROCEDURE UNDER THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921
AND THE TRADE ACT OF 1974
Although a district director of the Customs Service could begin an
investigation on his own initiative,3 2 this rarely happened 33 under the
prior statutory scheme.34 Generally, an investigation began when a
complaint was submitted by a representative of the domestic industry
whose market was allegedly being threatened.35 This complaint had to
contain certain information: a description of the goods in question,
and sufficient price and injury data to indicate, first, that sales were
28 The injury standard has been raised by the new Act to "material injury." Pub. L. No. 96-
39, 93 Stat. 144, § 731 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
29 See Barcelo, supra note 10, at 499.
30 "The intent of Congress was not to impose a penalty, but an amount of duty sufficient to
equalize competitive conditions." R. STURM, A MANUAL OF CUSTOMS LAW 134 (1976) (citing
Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961); C.J. Tower & Sons v.
United States, 71 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1934); Kleberg & Co., Inc. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332
(C.C.P.A. 1933)). See also Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1400 (Cust. Ct.
1971).
31 In this respect anti-dumping law resembles the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-
13(a), 21(a) (1976). It seems that this purpose could be better effectuated, however, if the law
concentrated on predatory dumping alone. See note 23 supra.
32 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.25 (1979).
33 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 465. In 1978, a new feature, the trigger price mechanism, was
added to Treasury Department procedures in an effort to improve the ability of the Customs
Service to detect possible dumping, but it was rarely employed. Seegenerally Kantor, The Trigger
Price Mechanism." Limitation on Administrative Discretion under the Antidumping Laws, 11 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 443 (1978); Comment, Effective Enforcement of U.S. Antidumping Laws: The
Development and Legal Implications of Trigger Pricing, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433 (1979); Note,
Effective Enforcement of U.S Antidumping Laws. The Development andegal lmplications of Trig-
ger Pricing, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 969 (1978); Note, Trigger Prices- A Shot in the Dark?, 18
VA. J. INT'L L. 771 (1978).
34 For a detailed discussion of past antidumping procedures, see E. ROSSID.S, U.S. CUSTOMS,
TARIFF AND TRADE 423-53 (1977); U.S. CUSTOMS DEP'T CUSTOMS ANTIDUMPING HANDBOOK
(1978); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 464-67.
35 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.26 (1979).
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being made at less than fair value (LTFV) and, second, that the indus-
try was being injured by these LTFV sales.36 If the complaint was in-
adequate in these respects, it was returned to the complainant.37
If the complaint was adequate, the Treasury Department then un-
dertook an initial thirty-day inquiry.38 If the Secretary of the Treasury
determined that the complaint could not be substantiated or that fur-
ther investigation was unwarranted, he would terminate the investiga-
tion.39 If the Secretary found that there was "a substantial doubt" that
the domestic industry was being injured, he would refer the complaint
to the United States International Trade Commission (ITC).4 ° The
ITC then would have thirty days to determine either that there was "no
reasonable indication" of injury as defined in the Act,41 in which case it
would terminate the investigation; or that a "reasonable indication" did
exist, in which case the full-scale Treasury investigation would con-
tinue.4 2
If the investigation continued, the Secretary had a number of du-
ties: he was required to publish an anti-dumping proceedings notice in
the Federal Register;43 to request pricing information from foreign
manufacturers and domestic importers;' to verify the information by
traveling to the exporting county, if necessary;45 and to hold a series of
disclosure conferences in which "interested parties"-usually the do-
mestic producers-could inspect the non-confidential submissions and
suggest further avenues of inquiry.46 Commercially sensitive informa-
tion submitted by foreign producers, such as trade secrets, production
and distribution costs or customer lists, could be designated confiden-
tial and therefore made available only in summary form to the inter-
36 19 C.F.R. § 153.27 (1979).
37 Id at § 153.28.
38 Id at § 153.29. See generally McDermid & Foster, T7he U.S. International Trade Commis-
sions, 30-Day Inquiry Under the 4nt/dumping 4c!: Section 210(c)(2), 27 MERCER L. REV. 657
(1976).
The Treasury Department was originally assigned responsibility for both the LTFV and the
injury determinations, but the responsibility for injury determination was transferred to the
United States Tariff Commission by the Act of September 1, 1954, 68 Stat. 1138, § 301 (1954).
The Tariff Commission was renamed the United States International Trade Commission by the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, § 321(a)(1) (1974).
39 19 C.F.R. § 153.29(a) (1979).
40 Id at § 153.29(b).
41 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) (1976).
42 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.29(b), 207.2-.3 (1979).
43 19 C.F.R. § 153.30 (1979).
44 Id at § 153.31(b).
45 Id at § 153.31(a).
46 Id at §§ 153.31(c)-(d).
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ested parties. 7
Six months after the publication of the anti-dumping proceedings
notice, or nine months in complicated cases, the Secretary was required
to make a tentative determination.4 8 He had to decide either: (1) to
discontinue the investigation on the basis of "price assurances" re-
ceived from the foreign exporters or because of other reasons;49 (2) to
make a finding of no sales at LTFV;50 or (3) to make a finding of LTFV
sales and thus immediately withhold appraisement.5  Notice of the
tentative determination had to be published in the Federal Register. 2
Withholding of appraisement meant that the determination of du-
ties on goods arriving from overseas or on goods withdrawn from U.S.
Customs warehouses would be postponed until the end of the with-
holding period and that these goods could not enter the U.S. market
unless an appropriate bond was filed.5 3 Appraisement would be with-
held for three months unless a six-month withholding period was re-
quested by one of the parties. 4 Although appraisement was generally
withheld only on goods entered for determination of duties after the
date of the tentative determination, the Treasury Department, at its dis-
cretion, could retroactively include any imports that had entered the
United States up to 120 days before the initiation of the investigation
and had not yet been released to the U.S. market.
5
After the tentative determination was made, an oral hearing on the
matter was then conducted, if requested by one of the parties, and an
opportunity for written submissions was provided for the manufactur-
ers and importers involved. 6 Then, within three months of the notice
of tentative determination, or six months if the extension on the with-
holding period had been granted, the Secretary made a final determi-
nation. The Secretary could: (1) discontinue the investigation,
47 Id at §§ 153.22-.23.
48 Id at § 153.32.
49 Id at § 153.33. Price assurances, also known as price undertakings, are simply agreements
between the agency and the foreign exporters to raise the price of the exports so as to eliminate the
margin of dumping, le., the difference between the sale price in the United States and the fair
market value. Id.
50 Id at § 153.34(a).
51 Id at §§ 153.35, 153.37.
52 Id at §§ 153.33(b), 153.34(a), 153.37(b).
53 E. RoSSIDES, supra note 34, at 442. If the final determination is affirmative, then dumping
duties will be assessed upon all goods on which appraisement was withheld. Id
54 19 C.F.R. § 153.35 (1979). The six-month period was requested and obtained in about 95%
of the cases. This allowed the parties more time to develop arguments and confer. E. RosSIDES,
supra note 34, at 442.
55 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.35(d) (1979).
56 19 C.F.R. § 153.40 (1979).
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accepting the offered price assurances and implementing the appropri-
ate monitoring mechanism;57 (2) terminate the investigation with a
final finding of no sales at LTFV;58 or (3) make an affirmative finding,
in which case he would withhold appraisement on the imports, if he
had not already done so. 5 9 If appraisement was withheld, the Secretary
was also required to publish a complete statement of reasons and find-
ings consistent with the confidentiality regulations and to refer the in-
vestigation to the ITC.6 0
Upon referral from the Treasury, the ITC published notice of its
investigation.6 1 The ITC then sought written submissions from the
parties, and if the ITC deemed it worthwhile, it held a public hearing.
62
Within three months a determination was made either that the domes-
tic industry was not being injured by the dumping and the proceeding
was terminated, or that the industry was indeed being injured.63 If in-
jury was discovered, this finding was communicated to the Treasury
Department.64
Upon an affirmative finding from the ITC, the Secretary would
publish a dumping finding in the Federal Register and request the Cus-
toms Service to begin assessing dumping duties.65 Release of the goods
to the domestic market would still be conditioned upon the filing of an
adequate bond.6 The Customs Service would then prepare master lists
of the different makes and models of the dumped goods and proceed to
assess duties on a case-by-case basis.67
PROCEDURAL CHANGES ENACTED BY THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
ACT OF 1979
Five of the most important changes in anti-dumping procedure
contained in the new Act are: (1) shortened time limits for dumping
determinations; (2) complex and extensive new provisions governing
57 Id at §§ 153.33(c), (f). If the foreign exporter chose to raise prices, then a statement of the
agreement had to be received at the Treasury and periodic reports were required. Id at
§ 153.33(c). If the exporter chose to leave the U.S. market instead, he could not re-enter for five
years. Id at § 153.33(i).
58 Id at § 153.34(c).
59 Id at § 153.38.
60 id at § 153.41.
61 id at § 207.4(b).
62 Id at §§ 207.4(c)-(d).
63 Id at § 207.4(e).
64Id
65 Id at § 153.43.
66 Id. at §§ 153.50-.51.
67 Id at § 153.57.
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the use of price undertakings or assurances; (3) liberalized rules for dis-
closure of confidential information; (4) the new availability of cash de-
posits of estimated dumping duties as a provisional remedy; and (5) the
retroactive application of dumping duties under "critical circum-
stances."
Shortened Time Limits for Dumping Determinations
There are three stages in an anti-dumping investigation: the initial
inquiry, the preliminary determination, and the final determination.
The 1979 Act allocates less time for each of these phases than did prior
legislation.
In the initial inquiry, the Department of Commerce 68 now has
only twenty days after the initiation of an investigation to test the suffi-
ciency of the allegations of the dumping complaint instead of the thirty
days that the Treasury Department had under the old scheme.69 Fur-
thermore, the ITC has only forty-five days after the initiation of an
investigation to decide whether there is a "reasonable indication" of
injury, while previously the ITC had another thirty days after the mat-
ter was referred from the Treasury.7 °
The preliminary determination stage has been abridged from
seven months to 160 days. 7 1 As before, more time may be sought to
investigate complicated cases; the time limit may be extended to 210
days if the Commerce Department finds that "novel issues" or numer-
ous transactions are involved.72 Regardless of the complexity of the
68 The 1979 Act made one change that is incidental to the main discussion of this paper, and is
yet very important. Because of wide dissatisfaction with inadequate enforcement, arbitrary deci-
sions, and long delays in investigation and assessment of duties, Congress removed the responsi-
bility for LTFV investigation from the Treasury Department and vested that responsibility with
an unspecified "administering authority," leaving the assignment of functions to the President.
Many critics felt that the Treasury's enforcement and diplomatic responsibilities conflicted. 1979
Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 40, 73; Kantor, supra note 33, at 448.
In his Reorganization Plan No. 3, President Carter transferred the responsibility for enforce-
ment and LTFV determination to the Commerce Department, and placed the responsibility for all
overarching policy decisions with the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
15 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1476, reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273
(1979). After the time for congressional objection passed, the plan became effective. 44 Fed. Reg.
74,781 (1979).
69 The complaint must make the same allegations and supply the same information as under
the prior legislation. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 732(c)(1) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673a). See also note 42 and accompanying text supra.
70 In the peculiar bureaucratic double negative, the ITC does not determine that there is no
reasonable likelihood of material injury. Pub. L. No. 93-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(a) (1979) (to be
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b). See also Acrylic Sheet from Japan, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,509 (1975).
71 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(b)(1) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
72 Id at § 733(c)(I)(B) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
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case, however, the time limit may be extended if the petitioner makes a
timely request.73
A new feature of the law allows a drastic contraction of the prelim-
inary determination stage. Seventy-five days after the initiation of the
investigation, the petitioner and all other interested parties are offered
an opportunity to waive the verification process, and to proceed to a
determination on the evidence submitted by the foreign manufacturers
prior to that time.74
The final determination phase has been shortened from the origi-
nal nine months to seventy-five days.7" An extension of up to 135 days
may be sought by the foreign manufacturer if the preliminary determi-
nation is affirmative or by the petitioner if the preliminary determina-
tion is negative.76  This contrasts with the six-month extension
available under the prior legislation. The ITC now has only 120 days
after the preliminary determination by the Commerce Department in
which to make its final determination, although if the LTFV investiga-
tion is extended, the ITC has until the forty-fifth day after the final
determination by the Commerce Department to complete its investiga-
tion.77
New Codffed Procedures on Acceptance of PriceAssurances
Previously, the Treasury Department had broad discretion to ne-
gotiate, accept, and monitor undertakings or agreements.78 In contrast,
the new Act creates a complex mechanism to regulate the use of agree-
ments and undertakings.
An investigation may be terminated at any time if the petitioner
simply withdraws his petition.79 An investigation also may be sus-
pended if those foreign exporters who account for "substantially all" of
the imports in question agree to stop dumping.8" The exporters may
agree to cease all exports within six months, or they may agree to a
price assurance or undertaking under which they will adjust their prices
so as to eliminate the dumping margins.81 If a price undertaking is
agreed upon, the amount of future imports by the foreign parties may
73 Id at § 733(c)(1)(A).
74 Id at § 733(b)(2).
75 Id at § 735(a)(1) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d).
76 Id at § 735(a)(2).
77 Id at § 735(b).
78 See notes 141-143 and accompanying text infra.
79 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 734(a) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c).
80 Id at § 734(b).
81 Id
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not exceed the amount imported over the "most recent representative
period."
8 2
If the Commerce Department determines that "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" are present, however, then the agreement must demon-
strate that it will eliminate all injurious effects resulting from LTFV
sales before it can be accepted.83 Under extraordinary circumstances,
import entries will be examined on an entry-by-entry basis by the Cus-
toms Service to assure that the agreement is being observed. 4 Circum-
stances are considered extraordinary if "novel issues" or numerous
transactions or parties are involved."'
There are five prerequisites to the acceptance of a price undertak-
ing. First, the agreement must be "in the public interest."8 Second,
those producers who account for "substantially all" of the imports at
issue must all agree to the undertaking.87 Third, the Customs Service
must implement an effective monitoring system for the agreement. 88
Fourth, the Commerce Department must give notice of the agreement
and provide interested parties with a chance to comment on and, if
necessary, to seek judicial review of the terms of the undertaking.89 Fi-
nally, the suspension of the investigation must be accompanied by an
affirmative preliminary determination of dumping.9" This determina-
tion does not result in the application of provisional remedies, such as
withholding of appraisement, or, as it is termed in the new Act, suspen-
sion of liquidation,9 unless the agreement is breached. In the case of a
breach, liquidation is immediately suspended, that is, appraisement is
withheld and the investigation is resumed at the point of interruption.92
Intentional violations of a price undertaking, although they are difficult
to prove, may be subject to further civil sanctions.93
If any interested party94 desires a determination as to wh,,.her
82 Id at § 734(d)(2).
83 Id at § 734(c).
84 Id.
85 Id at § 734(c)(2).
86 Id at § 734(d)(1)(A).
87 Id at § 734(b).
88 Id at § 734(d)(1)(B).
89 Id at § 734(e).
90 Id at § 734(f)(1)(A).
91 Id at § 733(d)(1) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
92 Id at § 734(i)(1)(A) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c).
93 Id at § 734(i)(2).
94 An "interested party" is defined by the 1979 Act to be either a foreign exporter, the govern-
ment of that exporter, a domestic manufacturer, a trade association representing manufacturers,
or a union whose members are employed in the industry. Id at § 771(9) (to be codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1677).
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dumping indeed has occurred, however, it may request that the investi-
gation continue, despite the agreement.95 Then, if the final determina-
tion is negative, the undertaking or agreement is no longer binding; if
affirmative, the determination will not be given effect unless there has
been a violation of the agreement.96 If there is a breach after such an
affirmative final determination of dumping, duties are assessed imme-
diately.
97
New Liberalized Rules for Disclosure of Confidential Information
Prior to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, all disclosure rules
were promulgated by the agencies, rather than enacted by Congress.98
The new Act incorporates those rules to a large extent. Nonconfiden-
tial information from foreign manufacturers and summaries of confi-
dential information remain available to interested parties, 99 and
disclosure meetings are still exparte, although a record of each meeting
must now be kept by the investigating agency. 1°°
Unlike the prior regulations, however, the new Act additionally
allows the release of confidential information under a protective order
to representatives of interested parties.10 1 If a request for such a release
is denied by the agency, the party may appeal the decision to the Cus-
toms Court.10 2 To prevent possible competitive injury to foreign man-
ufacturers, however, either the agency or the court may enforce the
order through contempt citations.
10 3
Cash Deposit of Estimated Dumping Duties as a Provisional Remedy
Under the previous statutory scheme, an affirmative preliminary
or final determination would cause the appraisement of foreign imports
to be withheld. These goods would be released to the U.S. market,
however, if the importer secured the amount of possible duties with a
bond.104 Under the new Act, upon an affirmative determination, liqui-
dation is suspended, and either a bond or a cash deposit for the full
amount of the estimated dumping duties, as the Customs Service deems
95 Id at § 734(g) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c).
96 Id at § 734(f)(3).
97 Id
98 See 19 C.F.R. at §§ 153.22-.23 (1979).
99 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 777(a)(4) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 16770.
100 Id at § 777(a)(3).
101 Id at § 777(a).
102 Id
103 Id
104 See notes 53 and accompanying text supra.
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appropriate, must secure each import entry.'
0 5
Retroactive Application of Dumping Duties Under "Critical
Circumstances"
Prior legislation conferred upon the Treasury Department the dis-
cretion to assess dumping duties retroactively for a period up to 120
days prior to the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation.' 6 Under
the new law, a petitioner may seek retroactive application by making a
timely allegation of "critical circumstances."'0 7 Circumstances are crit-
ical if there has been a history of dumping in the industry or if there
has been intentional dumping, and if, in either case, there has been
massive dumping over a brief period of time.'0 8 If such an allegation
has been made, the Commerce Department and the ITC must decide at
the time of the final determination whether critical circumstances ex-
ist.'0 9 If so, then all goods entered for appraisement in the ninety days
prior to the date of the suspension of liquidation, in addition to goods
entered after that date, will be withheld for assessment of dumping du-
ties. "o
CRITICISM OF THE NEw ANTI-DUMPING PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979
A foreign manufacturer who faces a dumping complaint must de-
cide whether to defend against the complaint or to discontinue export-
ing; a foreign manufacturer who confronts the possibility of a dumping
complaint must decide whether he will risk a proceeding or, instead,
change his pricing policy, perhaps choosing not to export at all. In a
variety of ways, the five major procedural changes introduced by the
new Act add to the cost and the uncertainty of an anti-dumping investi-
gation and, thus, will have a discouraging effect on some foreign ex-
porters.
Shortened Time Limits for Dumping Determinations
In prescribing any time limits for anti-dumping investigations,
105 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(d)(3) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
106 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.35(d) (1979).
107 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(e) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b). The
allegation may be made at any time up to 20 days before the final determination by the Commerce
Department. Id
108 Id at § 733(e)(1)(A). "Hit-and-run" or "sporadic" dumping usually involves only a few
shipments within a short time. Barcelo, supra note 10, at 508.
109 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, §§ 735(a)(3), (b)(4) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d).
110 Id at § 733(e)(2) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
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there is a trade-off between the interest in granting early relief to do-
mestic producers and the interest in making an accurate and fair find-
ing.11' The Antidumping Act of 1921 placed no time limits on
investigations, with the result that substantial delays were common.'
12
This occasionally worked hardship on domestic industries beleaguered
by predatory pricing. One extreme example is the case of Television
Receiversfrom Japan,113 in which several years passed between the ini-
tiation of the investigation and the effective enforcement of the dump-
ing determination." 4 As a result of the delay, several domestic
television manufacturers went out of business." 5  In response to this
case, Congress, in the Trade Act of 1974,116 set time limits for the vari-
ous determinations.
11 7
The further contraction of time limits in the 1979 Act is the result
of a continuing, but now unnecessary congressional reaction to past lax
enforcement by the Treasury Department." 8 Backlogs in dumping
duty assessment will be effectively eliminated by the new time limits on
assessment;" 9 the time limits enacted by the 1974 Act have been ade-
quate to prevent the sort of delays that occurred in Television Receivers
from Japan. 120 The new provisions only marginally hasten relief-by a
month and a half, at most-while they make it much more difficult to
collect useful data necessary to an accurate determination of dump-
ing.12
1
111 See 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
112 See Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 208-09 (statement of John Nevin, Chairman,
Zenith Radio Corporation).
113 36 Fed. Reg. 4597 (1971) (imposing antidumping duties).
114 The history of Television Receivers from Japan, id, began with the filing of the complaint
in March, 1968. In December, 1970, the Treasury Department notified the ITC of a determination
of LTFV sales. In March 1971, the ITC found that over half of the 15 or 16 domestic television
producers then in business had suffered losses. A dumping finding was entered and the Customs
Department assessed about one million dollars in duties between March 1971 and March 1972.
Assessment was then discontinued without explanation. In 1976, the ITC sought to reinvestigate,
but was denied access to the files. In March 1978, the Justice Department received evidence of
kickbacks and double pricing in the Japanese TV import business. The Customs Department then
discovered that its figures were totally inaccurate and attempted to assess 400 million dollars in
past duties. Treasury subsequently sought to settle for about 50 million dollars, and the deadline
for the settlement was extended at least three times over a four-month period. Senate M'TNHear-
ings, supra note 3, at 207-09 (statement of John Nevin, Chairman, Zenith Radio Corporation).
115 Id
116 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5-8, 15, 19, 21-22,
26, 42, 45 U.S.C).
117 Id at § 321(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976)).
118 See House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 102 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
119 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 736(c)(1) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673e).
120 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.32, .33(c), .33(f), .41, 207.4(e).
121 See House MfTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 102 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
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The shorter time limits impede effective data collection in a
number of ways. First, some initial investigatory decisions, such as the
use of constructed value' 2 in place of foreign market value in the
LTFV determination, are based upon the character of the initial sub-
missions.123 These decisions determine the subsequent thrust of the in-
vestigation, and a hasty, erroneous decision would be difficult to correct
later. The use of an inappropriate valuation, for instance, would inac-
curately reflect the fair values of the goods at issue and may lead to an
improper determination of dumping; a change to the correct valuation
would require collection and verification of completely new data within
the remaining statutory period.124
Second, the briefer time periods affect data collection during the
course of the investigation. Generally, the investigating agency first
drafts a questionnaire seeking the information it believes will be impor-
tant. 125 To verify the evidence obtained in response to those question-
naires, representatives of the agency may need to travel to the
exporter's country.'2 6 In subsequent disclosure conferences, domestic
producers will indicate what additional information will be needed.'
27
The consequence of shortened time limits is that there will be less time
to draft adequate questionnaires, less time for thorough verification,
and less time for a helpful series of disclosure conferences. 2 8 In this
connection, it is interesting to note that an examination of anti-dump-
ing cases prosecuted under the previous schedule revealed that in al-
most every case the agencies utilized the entire statutory period for
each determination.
129
122 See note 16 supra.
123 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 773 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b). The
decision to use constructed value or third country value depends on the amount of product sales
made in the producer country, and the similarity of the goods in the producer country with the
exported goods. See GA. Note, note 16 supra.
124 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 746-47 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail
Cumins).
125 E. RoSSIDES, supra note 34, at 448.
126 Id
127 Id
128 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
129 In a study of 33 cases initiated and completed between January 1, 1975 and January 1, 1978,
the initial inquiry was completed within 21 days in only four cases: Capacitors from Japan, 40
Fed. Reg. 48,702 (1975); Digital Automatic Scales from Japan, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,746 (1976); Pres-
sure Sensitive Plastic Tape from West Germany, 41 Fed. Reg. 36,521-22 (1976); and Ice Hockey
Sticks from Finland, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,345 (1977). In only one case was the preliminary investiga-
tion completed in as little as five months, and in that case the determination was negative. Tires
from Canada, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,869 (1975). On the other hand, in fourteen cases the times for the
preliminary determination was extended, in all but two cases for the statutory maximum of nine
months. See, e.g., Metal Walled Swimming Pools from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 17,558 (1976); Ski
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In two ways, then, the agencies may be unable to collect useful or
sufficient information on which to base a decision. As a result, the
agency will prefer to err on the side of domestic protection and provi-
sional remedies. The Commerce Department and the ITC may make a
greater number of affirmative preliminary determinations that will be
reversed by the final determinations; 130 the agencies may even make
affirmative final determinations in cases where there actually has been
no dumping. 13 1 Unwarranted assessments of dumping duties would
have a serious impact upon the pricing decisions of foreign exporters,
for even a temporary suspension of liquidation may be harmful be-
cause it could drive marginally successful companies out of business.1
32
One rationale for the shorter time limits is that they would make it
more difficult for an exporter who is aware of a dumping investigation
to quickly finish his dumping before the suspension of liquidation.
1 33
There is empirical evidence, however, that foreign exporters take such
action only in the most exceptional cases. 134 Certainly such action
would tend to make the dumping more obvious, to the detriment of the
exporter.
Although the problem of shortened time limits may be amelio-
rated by more substantial budgets of anti-dumping enforcement, the
agencies have not been guaranteed larger future appropriations.
35
Furthermore, the speed of an anti-dumping investigation depends to
some extent on factors beyond the agency's control: the foreign manu-
facturer must cope with questions in a foreign language; he must sup-
ply data of a kind often not retained or compiled in the requested
format; and the goods themselves may be produced in numerous mod-
els or with unique characteristics, each of which must be distin-
guished. 136 Even a huge increase in funding, facilities, and staff will do
little to hasten completion of these aspects of the investigation.1
37
Bindings from Austria, Switzerland, West Germany, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,847-48 (1975); Automobiles
from Belgium, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, West Germany, 40 Fed.
Reg. 33,755-58 (1975).
130 Senate MATN Hearings, supra note 3, at 40 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President, Kemp
& Beatly Corp.).
131 Id
132 House MTN hearings, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of William Eberly, Representative,
American Chamber of Commerce).
133 Id
134 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 271 (report of the Comptroller of the United
States).
135 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 301 (statement of Ferroalloys Assoc.).
136 Id at 40-41 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President, Kemp & Bealy Corp.); 1979 Trade
Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
137 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 40-41 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
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New Codfed Procedures on Acceptance of Price Assurances
Price assurances are an appropriate remedy for dumping because
the anti-dumping law is essentially a remedial statute and its purpose is
served by voluntary elimination of dumping margins.'38 For domestic
producers, price assurances generally provide relief more quickly than
the provisional remedies which accompany an affirmative preliminary
or final determination of dumping.'39 For the foreign manufacturers,
price assurances provide greater certainty in commercial transactions
and obviate the need for a costly defense and submissions of confiden-
tial information. 4 °
Despite the fact that the Antidumping Act of 1921 contained no
provision for price assurances, such agreements evidently were liberally
used until the mid-1970's.14a At that time, domestic producers, through
their congressmen, greatly criticized the Treasury Department for ac-
cepting agreements that were considered too advantageous to foreign
producers and for insufficiently monitoring subsequent compliance." 2
In response, the Treasury Department adopted a very restrictive policy;
assurances were no longer accepted unless the margin of dumping was
less than one percent of a weighted average of all imports.
4 3
The new Act contains no such mathematical restrictions. Never-
theless, the same sort of criticisms as those previously directed to the
Treasury Department seem to have guided the drafting of the section of
price assurances."' The complicated new provisions are likely to re-
strict the usefulness of price assurances in several ways.
First, investigations can be continued merely upon the request of
an interested party, such as a domestic manufacturer or a union whose
members are employed in the industry. 4 Thus, a foreign competitor
may be harassed by an expensive investigation even after the reason for
Kemp & Beatly Corp.); 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hem-
mendinger).
138 House MTNHearings, supra note 3, at 33-4 (statement of Charles Carlisle, Representative,
Ad Hoc American Subsidies Coalition); Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 159-160 (state-
ment of John Rehm, Special Counsel, Senate Finance Committee).
139 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 482.
140 Id
141 See Johnson, Retroactive Application of the Antidumping Act of 1921, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 262, 264-65 n.10 (1979). Since 1975, there have been only two discontinuances of investiga-
tion although 16% of all past complaints were disposed of through price assurances. Id
142 See Barcelo, supra note 10, at 543; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 481.
143 T.D. 70-127, 4 CusToMs BULL. 293 (1970). See also Barcelo, supra note 10, at 543;
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 481.
144 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 707 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
145 See note 94 supra.
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the proceeding has ceased to exist. 146 The opportunity to continue the
investigation greatly reduces the incentive to agree to a price undertak-
ing.
Second, the penalty for violators of price assurances seems unduly
punitive.147 Upon acceptance of a price assurance, an affirmative pre-
liminary determination is automatically made. If the undertaking is
subsequently violated, liquidation is immediately suspended.1 48 For-
eign exporters often agree to a price assurance simply because they find
it easier to raise prices than to defend against a dumping complaint. 149
If that agreement is violated, however, the foreign exporters face a
three-month suspension of liquidation even though the original investi-
gation might have led to a negative determination. Moreover, the vio-
lation may be inadvertant or circumstances may have changed to the
point where the breach is harmless. 5 The civil sanctions imposed on
intentional violators are also contrary to the remedial nature of the Act,
although these provisions may be unenforceable in practice.
1 51
Third, the wording of the 1979 statute requires all of those produc-
ers, who account for "substantially all" of the imports at issue, to agree
to the undertaking before it may become effective. 52 In the case of a
large number of producers, each possessing a small share of the import
market, disagreement and dissension could make an agreement impos-
sible to reach. 153 In the case of a small number of producers, each con-
trolling a large share of the market, the provisions may require
unanimity.'5 4 It is unlikely, however, that an exporter's counsel will
recommend participation in the undertaking if there is a good chance
that a negative determination will be made concerning his client.'
55
Fourth, suspension of the investigation must be "in the public in-
terest."'156 This provision might be interpreted to require periodic re-
evaluations of the undertaking so that as costs and prices inflate, the
provisions of the undertaking are altered. This re-evaluation would be
146 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 707 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
147 Id
148 See notes 91-92 and accompanying text supra.
149 .4dministration Hearings, supra note 3, at 232 (statement of William Barringer).
150 Id
151 See 1979 TradeAct Hearings, supra note 3, at 707 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
152 See note 88 and accompanying text supra. "Substantially all" is likely to mean no less than





156 See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
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equivalent to administering prices on those imports.
157
New Disclosure Provisions for Confidential Submissions
The new disclosure provisions are designed to improve the ability
of agency personnel to acquire and verify information.15 Disclosure
conferences with representatives of domestic industry provide an im-
portant and independent check of the accuracy and relevance of sub-
missions from foreign manufacturers. 59 Under the prior rules,
however, it was difficult to verify confidential information because do-
mestic parties could not examine it in its original form, and summaries
of such information were often meaningless.1 60 Thus, under the new
rules, even confidential information is subject to critical examination.
These new provisions, however, will also have a discouraging ef-
fect on foreign trade. First, the new rules will impose "psychic costs"
on the foreign producers.' 6 1 Disclosure of highly sensitive confidential
information to domestic rivals would adversely affect the competitive-
ness of foreign manufacturers. 162 Thus, confidential information will
not be disclosed to shareholders or employees of the domestic produc-
ers, but only to counsel and then only for the purposes of the investiga-
tion. 163 The availability of civil and criminal contempt penalties may
be insufficient to prevent minor or inadvertent disclosures due to the
difficulty of detection. 6" Those foreign manufacturers who feel their
confidential information is sufficiently important may choose to discon-
tinue imports altogether rather than risk disclosure. Other manufactur-
ers may attempt to delay or avoid disclosing sensitive matters or try to
submit the bare minimum requested.165 For lack of certain informa-
tion, the agencies will be forced to make more arbitrary determinations.
Second, it seems that a meaningful review of the facts both prior to
the decisions to issue a protective order and on appeal will increase the
157 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 103 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
158 Id at 110-11 (statement of Charles Verrill, President, AMF, Inc.).
159 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 470.
160 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 110-11 (statement of Charles Verrill, President,
AMF, Inc.).
161 Id at 746.
162 Id
163 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 makes confidential information available under a pro-
tective order. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 777(c)(I)(B) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f). The protective order shall contain those requirments that the administering agencies
shall deem appropriate. Id The ITC has made confidential information available only to in-
dependent attorneys representing the domestic parties. 44 Fed. Reg. 76,458, 76,470 (1979).
164 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 746 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
165 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 706 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
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cost of anti-dumping investigation for the foreign producers. 166 Before
information is disclosed it is likely that some minimum showing of
need will be required.'67 This will precipitate more litigation and
greater costs as the foreign parties attempt to defend the confidentiality
of their submissions. 1
68
Cash Deposit of Estimated Dumping Duties as a Provisional Remedy
Upon the suspension of liquidation, the Commerce Department
has the option of compelling the cash deposit of estimated duties as
security for those duties that might later be assessed. 169 The intent of
Congress was to provide better protection for domestic industry over
the period before final duty assessment. 170 The new provisions may be
another legacy of Television Receivers from Japan and the inadequate
prior administration of the anti-dumping law.17 1 As will be demon-
strated below, the new measure is an improper solution to past
problems for it is contrary to the remedial nature of anti-dumping law.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the previous use of bonding to secure
future duties failed to provided the needed protection.
Deposit of estimated dumping duties is a punitive measure for a
number of reasons. First, after a dumping finding has been made, the
importer generally will raise his prices to eliminate the dumping mar-
gins. 172 In this way, the importer retains the extra income on each sale,
rather than losing it to the U.S. government as a dumping duty.173 This
does not subvert the Act; instead, the dumping margin is eliminated
and the remedial purpose of the law is fulfilled. 174 An example of such
a result is Elemental Sulphur from Mexico, 175 in which the dumping
margin was found to be seventy-three percent, but the actual assess-
ment on the goods amounted to only about three percent.' 76 Although
any excess assessment would eventually be refunded to the import-
166 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 110 (statement of Charles Verrill).
167 See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 76,458 (1979) (new ITC regulations).
168 House MTNHearings, supra note 3, at 746 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
169 See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
170 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 57-58 (statement of William Anderson, Dep'y
Director, Gen'l Gov't Position, GAO).
171 House MTNHearings, supra note 3, at 747 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins);
Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 239.
172 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 492 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beatly Corp.).
173 Id
174 Id
175 37 Fed. Reg. 2793 (1972).
176 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 492 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beatly Corp.).
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ers,'7 7 the new provision requires the importer to carry a dual burden:
during the period before final assessment, he must pay for past dump-
ing while simultaneously raising his present prices.178 This dual bur-
den is not only punitive, but it may also force many marginal
businesses into insolvency.
179
Second, the provisional duties are estimated on the basis of the
LTFV margins elicited in the investigation, and these LTFV margins
are a poor basis for estimating duties. The LTFV determination is
based on a historical period and does not reflect subsequent changes in
the prices of foreign and domestic goods.' Furthermore, the LTFV
margin is an aggregate value, derived from sampling the entire batch of
goods at issue, and it is arbitrary to apply this valuation to goods upon
which a duty eventually will be assessed on a case-by-case basis.18 1 It is
also true that the LTFV determinations are less exacting and rigorous
than the margin determinations made at the assessment stage.8 2 In
fact, errors, in LTFV determinations of five and ten percent are com-
mon. 1
8 3
Third, it has not been conclusively shown that bonding fails to
adequately protect domestic industry. While it is true that, in the past,
bonds usually covered only a fraction of the duties owing, the Customs
Service has reported that few, if any, duties have been lost as a result of
inadequate bonding.184 In any event, most importers immediately raise
their prices after a dumping finding, thus providing all the protection
that anti-dumping law seeks.'8 5
Bonding has also been criticized because it allows the foreign man-
ufacturer the use of the duties owing during the period of assess-
ment,8 6 and it further allows him to pay the duties in inflated
177 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 778 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 167 7g).
178 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 492 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beatly Corp.).
179 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 40 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President, Kemp
& Bealy Corp.).
180 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 189 (statement of American Importers Associa-
tion).
181 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 218 (statement of Richard Maxwell, Vice President,
American Importers Association).
182 Senate AMTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
183 Id
184 Senate MTNHearings, supra note 3, at 239 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
The Treasury policy stated that bonding was not intended to cover the total liability, but only the
risk factor. Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 49 (statement of John O'Loughlin, Duty
Assessment Div., Customs Service).
185 See notes 172-76 and accompanying text supra.
186 See McDermid & Foster, supra note 38, at 658-9.
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dollars.1 87 These two points are irrelevant, however, if the primary
purose of the Act-the cessation of dumping-is achieved. Further-
more, considering the costs of investigation and the costs of bonding, it
is difficult to see how bonding is of much investment value.
Finally, the critics of bonding often observe that other countries
require the deposit of estimated dumping duties. 18  Other countries as-
sess dumping duties in far fewer cases than does the United States, 18 9
however, and the gravity of those cases may demand a level of protec-
tion that the majority of U.S. cases do not.
Retroactive Application of Dumping Duties Under "Critical
Circumstances"
Although prior legislation provided for retroactive assessment of
dumping duties, the measure was discretionary and rarely invoked.190
Retroactive assessment under the 1979 Act is less discretionary: if
"critical circumstances" are proven, retroactive duties must be as-
sessed.' 91 Moreover, at least theoretically, a negative determination of
critical circumstances is reviewable.' 92
From the standpoint of free trade, the primary concern is the
greater uncertainty that the new provision creates for the foreign manu-
facturer. 93 The limits of potential liability are less clear and foreign
manufacturers may hesitate to export after the initiation of investiga-
tion. 9 4 Even if the ultimate determination is negative, the added risk
of retroactive assessment may discourage imports, particularly if the
industry is one with a history of dumping.
195
The new provision was intended to prevent "hit-and-run" dump-
187 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 210 (statement of John Nevin, President, Zenith
Radio Corporation).
188 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 49, 60 (statement of John O'Loughlin, Duty As-
sessment Div., Customs Service).
189 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 138 (statement of AFL-CIO).
190 See 1979 Trade-4ct Hearings, supra note 3, at 491 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beatly Corp.); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 482 n.38. Generally, retroactive duties were
assessed only when appraisement of the goods had been delayed for fortuitous reasons or when
the foreign exporter and the domestic importer were "related." Anthony, The American Response
to Bumpingfrom Capitalist and Socialist Economies, 54 COR ELL L. REv. 159, 193 n.127 (1968).
191 See notes 107-110 and accompanying text supra.
192 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 1001 (1979) (to be codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.).
193 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 491 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beady Corp.).
194 Id
195 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 271-2 (report of the Comptroller of the United
States).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:200(1980)
ing 196 and to discourage importers from attempting to quickly complete
their dumping before the suspension of liquidation. It is far from clear,
however, that "hit-and-run" dumping is harmful,' 97 and there is evi-
dence that importers do not try to take advantage of the lag between
the filing of a complaint and the application of provisional remedies.
19 8
Thus, the extra protection provided to domestic producers by retroac-
tive assessment is superfluous.
CONCLUSION
Basing its perception on a few anomalous cases, Congress was dis-
satisfied with prior anti-dumping procedure because it believed that a
sluggish investigatory timetable and an apathetic, perhaps even com-
plicit, exercise of discretion by the Treasury Department allowed
dumpers to evade effective censure. The new procedures were intended
to create a more potent enforcement mechanism: shortened time limits
were to provide relief to domestic industry more quickly; price assur-
ance provisions were to prevent easy agreement between agency and
foreign producer on assurances that were, nonetheless, detrimental to
domestic industry; new disclosure measures were to facilitate more in-
tensive investigation; cash deposit of estimated duties was to protect
domestic industry better over the period between detection of dumping
and remedy; and the critical circumstances provision was to provide an
easily ascertainable standard for application of harsher remedies.
Not only is greater domestic protection unnecessary, but by mak-
ing inappropriate changes, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 unfairly
burdens foreign manufacturers and domestic importers in a variety of
ways: the shortened time limits may lead to arbitrary and prejudicial
determinations; the price assurance provisions are punitive and greatly
discourage any quick and economical resolution of a complaint; the
new disclosure rules threaten the competitive secrets of foreign produc-
ers; the cash deposit of estimated duties punishes dumpers unnecessa-
rily; and the new critical circumstances determination engenders undue
uncertainty. By creating a more oppressive process for foreign produc-
ers, the new law may interfere with import and pricing decisions that
would normally be made under free trade conditions. This harms
196 See note 108 supra (definition of sporadic dumping).
197 "Hit-and-run" or "sporadic" dumping is "simply too brief and or haphazard to be seriously
injurious." Barcelo, supra note 10, at 508 (citing J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 30 (reprint ed. 1966)).
198 Admintration Hearings, supra note 3, at 271 (report of the Comptroller of the United
States).
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American consumers and contributes to an unjustified protection of
inefficient domestic industry.
Timothy J Patenode
